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Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) enabled devices have become more and more pervasive in our
everyday lives. Examples include wearables transmitting and processing personal data and smart
labels interacting with customers. Due to the sensitive data involved, these devices need to be
protected against attackers. In this context, hardware-based security primitives such as Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide a powerful solution to secure interconnected devices. The main
benefit of PUFs, in combination with traditional cryptographic methods, is that security keys are
derived from the random intrinsic variations of the underlying core circuit. In this work, we present
a holistic analog-based PUF evaluation platform, enabling direct access to a scalable design that can
be customized to fit the application requirements in terms of the number of required keys and bit
width. The proposed platform covers the full software and hardware implementations and allows for
tracing the PUF response generation from the digital level back to the internal analog voltages that
are directly involved in the response generation procedure. Our analysis is based on 30 fabricated
PUF cores that we evaluated in terms of PUF security metrics and bit errors for various temperatures
and biases. With an average reliability of 99.20% and a uniqueness of 48.84%, the proposed system
shows values close to ideal.
Keywords: analog physical unclonable function (PUF) system; security keys; reliable and unique
identifiers; IoT security
1. Introduction
The rapid growth of smart devices that are interconnected over the internet has opened up
new application fields such as wearables, smart home, smart grid, connected cars, and others.
Therefore, the superior term Internet of Things (IoT) as a megatrend has gained more and more
attention during the past few years. In general, the IoT includes a wide range of devices from simple
interconnected sensors to complex systems as such mobile devices, vehicles, and smart labels, to name
a few [1,2]. Interconnected devices carry sensitive data that can be a target of cyberattacks [3]. Typical
countermeasures include cryptographic methods, often based on random numbers used to generate
public and private keys. At this point, one should note that a secret is just as trustworthy as its origin.
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For that reason, researchers started to use the random intrinsic variations of electronic circuits to
generate unique and unclonable identifiers (IDs). These hardware-based security primitives are called
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and have been introduced in recent works for authentication,
identification, and cryptographic applications [4–6]. One of the great advantages of PUFs is that
there is no necessity for non-volatile memory, since the PUF generates keys on demand while being
stimulated. The general behavior of a PUF includes a system’s unpredictable response R, due to the
intrinsic variations, with respect to the system’s input stimulus, namely the challenge C, hence we
can conclude R = f (C), where f is not known and only influenced by the system or device-specific
variations [7,8].
Many existing PUFs, such as ring oscillator (RO) [9–11] and arbiter-based [7,12] designs,
are complex and hard to integrate for device manufacturers into their application ICs, due to great
design overheads or poor performance in security metrics. In the past years, analog-based PUF circuits
have been proposed that use lower complexity circuit designs while achieving very good results
in PUF security metrics. This property makes analog-based PUFs strong candidates as lightweight
security primitives for constrained devices [13].
In this work, we propose a real-hardware evaluation platform for an analog-based PUF,
implemented in a highly scalable design. The herein presented PUF as an embedded system covers
the entire software and hardware implementation and is verified through PUF security metrics as a
viable PUF design. Due to the discrete device approach, reconstruction of the platform is of relatively
low complexity compared to integrated circuit prototyping. This helps to enable applied research on
a highly stable analog PUF and allows for experimentally embedding this PUF system into existing
software frameworks at very low cost.
We provide the following contributions:
• The PUF evaluation platform as a scalable design with low design complexity.
• Detailed presentation of the peripherals and interfaces of the system.
• Software design and fabrication of 30 PUF cores.
• Experimental characterization and testing of internal analog voltages that are the basis of response
bit generation and discussion of the reliability metric on the analog level.
• Testing and evaluation of PUF security metrics including reliability, uniqueness, and bit errors in
the temperature range of −20 ◦C to 80 ◦C.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 explain the related work
and discuss the PUF design. The software and hardware implementation are addressed in Section 4.
In Section 5, the security analysis and experimental results are shown and Section 6 compares our
work with related PUFs. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Related Work
2.1. Classification of PUFs
Recent works have defined various classifications for PUFs that are based on how a PUF’s
intrinsic variations are exploited for the response bit generation. The most commonly used classes
divide into bi-stable or delay-based PUFs [14–21]. Other works also target the class of analog-based
PUF designs [22–26]. A further classification relies on the complexity of the challenge–response
mechanism, more particularly on the number of challenge–response pairs (CRPs). PUFs that exhibit a
small CRP space are called weak PUFs, often used in a controlled PUF configuration to extract secret
keys. PUFs providing a large CRP space are referred to as strong PUFs.
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 759 3 of 17
2.2. Related PUF Designs
A first approach for analog-based PUFs was presented by Lofstrom et al. in [22]. In their work,
a cell array of identical small-gate transistors sequentially addresses a resistive load that generates an
output bit-sequence depending on the device’s output voltage levels.
In another work, Sehwag et al. [23] presented the Threshold Voltage PUF (TV-PUF), using a
cascading method to increase small differences of threshold voltage variations in pass-transistors in
order to exploit its cumulated impact on the output voltage.
A hardware realization of transmission gate (TG) based analog PUFs, the Transmission Gate
PUF (TG-PUF), incorporating and measuring voltage drops across transmission-gate transistors,
was introduced in [24].
Another inverter-based PUF has been proposed in [25], where the main focus relies on exploiting
the inverter’s nonlinear output characteristics and cascading multiple blocks in series, making the PUF
more resilient to machine learning attacks in comparison to delay-based PUFs.
In [26], an analog-based PUF structure uses a CMOS architecture with biasing at the point of
maximum DC-gain, exploiting complementary inverter threshold voltage Vth variations.
Development boards with respect to hardware security can be deployed for digital PUFs such as
the HECTOR development board [27] or the SASEBO board [28].
To the best of our knowledge, almost all of the published works so far have either been simulated,
implemented on FPGAs, or fabricated as stand-alone chips and hence have not been characterized
to show their inherent properties such as voltage at critical nodes for the functionality of the PUF
design. Usually, when voltage levels at critical nodes are not known, instabilities in the response need
to be computed solely based on the binary bit values of the response. The usage of analog-to-digital
converters (ADCs) on these critical nodes allows for investigation of the voltages that lead to bit
generation. Based on the gained knowledge, thresholding techniques for robust bit generation can be
explored and deployed. To conduct further application-based research on any of the existing analog
PUFs, the designs have to be reconstructed and the prototype chip further investigated.
The presented work in this paper provides a building block for researching a scalable analog-based
PUF design, enabling security evaluation and optimization. In general, the proposed discrete PUF
design tackles typical shortcomings of chip-based PUFs which are higher initial fabrication costs,
longer production times, and less accessibility as needed in a research environment.
3. Proposed PUF Design
Our proposed PUF platform, as shown in Figure 1, consists of a microcontroller, the control logic
(also referred to as Evaluation Board), and the PUF core.
The platform enables direct access to the analog PUF in a full discrete board-level design, especially
designed for the used PUF core fabricated with M = 8 inverters. Furthermore, the proposed PUF
allows nonlinear bit-width scaling by increasing the number of PUF core inverters, comparable to
related PUF architectures as, e.g., RO-PUFs [5].
Each PUF core inverter is realized with a commercially available NMOS-transistor T and a
resistive load RL with 1 % variation. The sequential addressing process selects two inverters in parallel.
Due to process variations, the transistor drain currents ID differ slightly [29]. In combination with
the impact of resistive loads, this results in a variation of the inverter’s output voltage Vout. The PUF
core inverters are set up such that Vout ≥ Vov with Vov = Vin −Vth > 0 V, ensuring that the transistors
operate in the active region for nominal devices.
For signal routing, a constant input biasing voltage Vin is fed to the system. Vin is routed to
the two addressed inverter input terminals via two bi-directional multiplexers (MUXs), used as
demultiplexers (DEMUXs), as shown in the middle part of Figure 1. Each PUF core inverter output
voltage Vout is buffered by a voltage-follower configured operational amplifier (op-amp) to separate
the intrinsic variation source from the readout circuitry. Each buffered output voltage is routed to its
corresponding MUX input channel in both MUXs. Therefore, the same bi-directional multiplexers as
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for demultiplexing are deployed. The MUX1 output signal is routed to the positive comparator input
terminal and ADC channel 1, respectively. The output of MUX2 is routed to the negative comparator
input terminal and ADC channel 2, as shown in Figure 1. Each readout path utilizes a first-order RC
low-pass filter around a cut-off frequency of fc ≈ 10 kHz, which limits the signal-bandwidth of the
readout path.
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Figure 1. PUF platform block diagram (DAC: Digital-to-analog converter, ADC: Analog-to-digital
converter, MUX: Multiplexer, DEMUX: Demultiplexer, BA: Buffer amplifier).
3.1. PUF Challenge and Response
In general, a challenge C is composed of a set of sub-challenges, whereas one sub-challenge
ck consists of two inverter addresses (a, b) | a, b ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...M− 1} and the inverter input biasing
voltage Vin. Equation (1) defines the resulting sub-challenge tuples, where ck denotes the k-th
sub-challenge of C. Furthermore, rk = f (ck) denotes the sub-response of ck and the k-th
sub-response of R:
ck = (a, b, Vin). (1)
Basically, two arbitrary inverter addresses a and b can either be arranged in the combination
{a, b} or {b, a}. Due to the definition of the sub-challenge ck (see Equation (1)), for each pair of inverter
addresses, one response bit rk is produced. When reversing {a, b} to {b, a}, the binary value of response
bit rk should change to r̄k. This coherence can be used in a system test in order to detect defective
inverters. When determining the maximum response bit width Lmax ∈ N, such reversed addresses are
omitted in PUF, since they would degrade the self-information in proportion to the absolute bit width.
Thus, the condition {a, b} = {b, a}must be valid for all sub-challenges. For M inverters, the maximum
response bit width Lmax is determined by the binomial coefficient, as shown in Equation (2):
Lmax =
M · (M− 1)
2
. (2)
3.2. Systematic Variation Decomposition
For the further discussion, we define the general statement for the inverter’s varying output
voltage Vout,q with q ∈ {a, b}, which represents a sub-response rk of two arbitrarily addressed inverters
(see Figure 2a).
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Figure 2. PUF core bit generation using a comparator and corresponding timing diagram for
software-based sampling. (a) PUF core output voltages to comparator terminals; (b) exemplary
timing diagram showing the bit generation procedure.
The input voltage of the inverters at its input terminals is Vin,q = Vin,a = Vin,b. Nonetheless, due to
possible offset voltages in the biasing path, the input voltages might differ slightly. This would
introduce another systematic error directly affecting Vout,q. For our system, this possible effect
would be marginal and is therefore disregarded in the following discussion. Furthermore, the output
voltages are forwarded to the comparator terminal positive (p) and negative (m) inputs (see Figure 2a),
namely Vcomp,z with z ∈ {+,−}, which is shown in Equation (3):
Vcomp,z = Vout,q + Vε,z. (3)
Here, Vε,z describes the sum of systematic error voltages, caused due to the readout path of
the inverter array with Vε,z ∼ N (µ, σ2), where N denotes a normal distribution. Due to the PUF’s
differential approach, fluctuations of the PUF core’s supply voltage VDDcore and its impact on Vout,q
are suppressed, keeping ∆Vout = Vout,a −Vout,b constant over the time t of operation [30].
4. Software and Hardware Evaluation System
This section explains the software implementation of the microcontroller firmware of the PUF
evaluation system. Furthermore, the modular design of the fabricated hardware platform is shown.
4.1. Software Design
The PUF platform can be fully controlled by the user from a PC via a serial communication
interface. Similar to existing measurement instruments, the Standard Commands for Programmable
Instruments (SCPI) protocol [31] is used to send commands to the evaluation platform. The user
can configure the microcontroller software and set the PUF’s operating conditions (VDDcore and Vin).
Additionally, the timing of the PUF response generation procedure can be defined through the ts,1 and
ts,2 parameters, which also affect the ADC sampling time, as shown in Figure 2b.
Figure 3a shows the program flow as a state machine for sending PUF challenges including ADC
measurements. The software on the microcontroller behaves as shown in Figure 3b and is fully sensitive
regarding incoming SCPI commands. The microcontroller subsequently controls the DEMUX/MUX
circuits according to the addresses included in the sub-challenge ck. The corresponding inverter input
biasing voltage Vin is routed towards the two selected inverter input terminals. Additionally, the two
addressed inverter outputs are routed towards the comparator input terminals, as shown in Figure 1.
The voltages at both comparator input terminals are tracked via an ADC. Finally, the ADC values
and the sub-response rk are sampled by the microcontroller. This procedure is repeated until all
sub-challenges are processed and the full-length PUF response is generated. The microcontroller sends
the binary PUF response and the corresponding ADC values to the PC.
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Figure 3. PUF platform software. (a) flow diagram of the PC software; (b) flow diagram of the
microcontroller software (simplified).
4.2. Hardware Platform
The entire PUF evaluation platform consists of the PUF circuits and a microcontroller (EFM32
Leopard Gecko development board) used for PC communication, challenge addressing, and PUF
response readout. The PUF core design is kept modular such that single core entities are detachable,
allowing interchangeability of core circuits for large-scale characterization. Figure 4 shows the system
operating in a climatic chamber (Weiss WK3).
Figure 4. PUF platform in the climatic chamber.
5. Security Analysis
For the empirical evaluation of the PUF security metrics, we fabricated 30 PUF cores, extracted
the binary PUF responses, and measured the corresponding analog output voltages under the impact
of changing operating conditions. Table 1 shows all test cases applied in our experiments.
The supply voltages of the PUF control logic peripherals VDDeval , VDDcore, and Vin are provided
by a Keithley HM80403 triple power supply. We calculate the reliability, uniqueness, and bit errors
using the following procedure:
Step 1: Reference challenge. A fixed reference challenge Cre f is generated, consisting of all
combinations of inverter addresses emitted in lexicographic order without repetitions.
Step 2: Reference response. For each PUF core instance, a reference response Rre f is extracted
by applying the reference challenge under nominal operating conditions. The reference response is
defined by determining the most occurring bit sequence out of a set of 125 PUF responses measured
during the enrollment phase.
Step 3: Data acquisition. As shown in Table 1, for all test cases, each PUF core instance is evaluated
125 times under the stated operating conditions and its responses are stored in a database.
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Step 4: Analysis. In terms of PUF security analysis, the reliability, uniqueness, and bit errors across
all measured PUF cores are computed. Furthermore, by performing analog voltage measurements
with all PUF cores, the impact of voltage variations on the PUF metrics is investigated.
Table 1. Test cases for PUF experiments (test cases marked with × denote the configured testing setup,
* Ambient room temperature).
Test Ambient Temperature VDDcore Vin
Case −20 ◦C 0 ◦C 20 ◦C 25 ◦C * 40 ◦C 60 ◦C 80 ◦C 0.9 V 1.0 V 1.1 V 0.9 V 1.0 V 1.1 V
Temperature
variations
P1 × × ×
P2 × × ×
P3 × × ×
P4 × × ×
P5 × × ×
P6 × × ×
Supply
voltage
variations
P7 × × ×
P8 × × ×
P9 × × ×
P10 × × ×
P11 × × ×
P12 × × ×
P13 × × ×
P14 × × ×
P15 × × ×
5.1. Reliability Analysis
The reliability metric is a crucial factor in providing a robust outcome under environmental
variances and disturbances, keeping a PUF response stable by minimizing the need for post-processing
due to software-sided error correction [11]. The reliability RELn for PUF instance n is calculated on the
digital output level, as stated in Equation (4) [32]:
RELn = 100%−
1
T
T
∑
t=1
HD(Rre f ,n, R′n,t)
L
× 100%, (4)
where Rre f ,n describes the reference response at nominal conditions, meaning the nominal supply
voltage and ambient temperature conditions at room temperature, whilst R′n,t describes the PUF
response for T different ambient conditions and different supply voltages. The response bit width
is L ∈ N and the ideal value for reliability is 100% [32].
To decompose the response on the analog level, we look at the reliability solely based on the
Hamming distance (HD), as shown in Equation (5) for sub-response rk. Thereby, xl and yl define bit
strings of equal length L = 28 that are compared bitwise against each other:
HD =
L−1
∑
l=0
(xl ⊕ yl). (5)
Furthermore, we define states for voltages Vcomp,z and Vout,q according to Equations (6) and (7),
resulting in Equation (8):
Vcomp,+ = Vout,a + Vε,+, (6)
Vcomp,− = Vout,b + Vε,−, (7)
∆Vcomp = Vcomp,+ −Vcomp,−. (8)
The sub-response generated by the comparator is given as:
rk =
{
1 for Vcomp,+ > Vcomp,−,
0 for Vcomp,+ < Vcomp,−.
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The maximum reliability (with HD = 0) of the PUF is therefore achieved for the cases r̃k ∈ {xl , yl}:
r̃k =
{
1 for (Vout,a > Vout,b) ∧ (Vcomp,+ > Vcomp,−),
0 for (Vout,a < Vout,b) ∧ (Vcomp,+ < Vcomp,−).
This emphasizes the necessity of a design level co-optimization between the minimization of the
readout path’s error voltage Vε,z and its impact on the actual compared voltage at Vcomp,z along with
the maximization of Vout,q [9,20,33]. These constraints help to reduce unstable or even false detected
bits already at design level. As for the error voltages, the best case would be ∆Vε = Vε,+ −Vε,− = 0 V.
Nonetheless, this case remains unlikely for our system, as the comparator’s input offset voltage
limits the safely detectable voltage difference. However, to obtain a high similarity in each readout
path for our system, resistors with equal temperature coefficients and low variation are incorporated.
Moreover, the effect of leakage currents and resulting offset voltage errors are kept as low as possible.
The deployed comparator has low input offset voltage and low input leakage currents, thus resulting
in a systematic minimization of the error induced by the control logic.
The experimental measurement data of the voltage difference at the comparator input terminals
∆Vcomp over the specified temperature range (test cases P1 to P6) of ten PUF cores is visualized
in Figure 5a. The data shown in this plot corresponds to the voltage differences reached at each
temperature level, readout over 125 challenge–response cycles, which already provides sufficient
statistics for a narrow distribution of the reliability metric discussed later in this paper (see Figure 6).
The main data distribution of ∆Vcomp along the interquartile range (IQR) remains highly stable at
≈ 13 mV over the full measured temperature range. This shows the PUF’s good resilience over
temperature, thus achieving high reliability on the analog signal level.
-20 0 20 40 60 80
Ambient temperature in °C
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
V c
om
p i
n 
m
V
Median
Mean
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Response bit position
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
V c
om
p i
n 
m
V
Bits susceptible to flip
(b)
Figure 5. PUF comparator input voltage differences ∆Vcomp. (a) ∆Vcomp of ten PUF cores over ambient
temperature range, (b) ∆Vcomp per response bit of one selected PUF core (no. 20).
To gain insight into unstable responses, we plot ∆Vcomp of PUF core 20 over all response bits,
as shown in Figure 5b. The bit positions r0, r6, r12, and r25 show small absolute values for ∆Vcomp of
less than 200 µV, directly degrading reliability. As there is a chance that the output bits are biased
towards an output direction (logical 0 or 1) due to the comparator’s input offset voltage and, being
kept stable, thus generating a false output, or if both comparator input voltages are inflicted due to
noise, the comparator output is susceptible to showing flipping behavior.
On the digital level, the evaluation of the binary responses by means of Equation (4) results in an
average reliability of 99.20 %. Figure 6 shows the reliability distribution for ten measured PUF cores,
after performing test cases P1 to P15. All cores show reliabilities close to the ideal value of 100%.
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5.2. Uniqueness Analysis
In general, the uniqueness metric is a measure of how uncorrelated PUF responses are across
different instances. When applying the same input challenge to various PUF circuits of equal type,
ideally all responses should differ. We use the uniqueness metric introduced by Maiti et al. in [32].
For two different PUF instances i and j, each having L-bit (L ∈ N) responses Ri and Rj, the uniqueness
(or inter-device HD) for N ∈ N devices is defined as:
U =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=i+1
HD(Ri, Rj)
L
× 100%. (9)
The ideal value for uniqueness is 50%, indicating that all PUF responses are distinguishable.
We have assembled 30 PUF cores in total to evaluate the uniqueness metric as defined in
Equation (9). We applied a fixed challenge (full readout) to all PUF instances and measured their
responses. We evaluated 30× 28-bit PUF responses from independent PUF core hardware instances
under nominal conditions (test case P11) using the Evaluation Board A. The average uniqueness and
standard deviation are µA = 48.84% and σA = 18.83%, respectively. Figure 7 shows the distribution of
the uniqueness among the evaluated PUF cores. We repeated the measurements by utilizing a second
Evaluation Board B, which is an identically constructed counterpart of Evaluation Board A. The results
yield a mean of µB = 48.84% and variance of σB = 18.83%, which is identical to the results achieved
with Evaluation Board A. The cross validation shows that the uniqueness is independent from the
Evaluation Board used for PUF core addressing and readout, which is consistent with our assumption
and intended design. The resulting uniqueness values are close to the ideal value of 50%.
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Figure 7. Uniqueness bar chart (test case P11).
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5.3. Uniformity Analysis
The uniformity metric is an indicator for the balance of ’0s and ’1’s in the PUF response bits.
Ideally, both binary values should occur equiprobable in a PUF response [32]. For PUF instance n,
having an L-bit (L ∈ N) response Rn,l at bit position l, the uniformity is defined as:
Un =
1
L
L−1
∑
l=0
Rn,l × 100%. (10)
For our analysis, we used the reference responses of 30 fabricated PUF cores measured in our
uniqueness evaluation. We computed the uniformity value for each PUF core and response with
respect to Equation (10). The resulting mean uniformity is 45.60%, which is close to the ideal value of
50%. Figure 8 shows the box plot for all measured PUF responses. In general, a uniformity value lower
than 50% means that the response is biased towards 0. The results for the uniformity are consistent
with our analysis on the analog voltage level, where the mean value for the comparator input voltage
difference is slightly negative, as shown in Figure 5a.
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Figure 8. PUF uniformity box plot.
Identification, which is one subgroup in the field of security, mainly relies on unique identifiers.
In the ideal case, the entire binary address space for a given bit width can be used for distinction
between single instances. In this context, the uniqueness metric shows how distinguishable the
PUF responses are. In the context of cryptographic key derivation, the PUF response bits should be
uniformly distributed. The greater the deviation from 50%, the easier to guess the response by an
attacker. Our results show that the mean uniformity is around the ideal value. However, there are some
PUF responses that are non-uniform, which makes the proposed PUF’s raw responses a candidate for
identification applications, rather than for deriving cryptographic keys.
5.4. Bit Error Analysis
A bit error is a bit that flips between the binary values 0 and 1, when generating it multiple
times consecutively. Such bit flips degrade both the reliability and uniqueness metrics. We have
already discussed this coherence before in our reliability investigations. However, when evaluating
fabricated PUFs, very often it might be useful to investigate the bit errors/flips that occur due to
ambient temperature changes or supply voltage fluctuation over time. For that reason, we calculate the
bit errors in percent for each PUF core that occurred during repeated response measurements. The bit
error BEn for PUF instance n is defined as the sum of all HDs between its reference response Rre f ,n
and W measured responses R′n,w for the same reference challenge, both of the length L ∈ N:
BEn =
1
W
W
∑
w=1
HD(Rre f ,n, R′n,w)
L
× 100%. (11)
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This metric can be considered as an extension of reliability and uniqueness evaluation. Hereby,
bit errors can be investigated and made visible easier when analyzing PUF responses core by core.
Even when using a differential bit generation approach as in our PUF, bit errors might still
occur due to changing environmental conditions and random noise. In some cases, the comparator
input voltages differ very slightly, which potentially results in bit flipping over time, directly causing
degradation of the reliability and uniqueness metrics. When using PUFs for unique ID generation,
i.e., in identification applications, a typically applied approach is to define a binning technique in order
to distinguish between individual IDs. The higher the amount of flipped bits within an ID, the less the
uniqueness. As a consequence, low uniqueness leads to enlarged bins in the binning model. For that
reason, we evaluate bit errors of PUF across the ambient temperature range from −20 ◦C to 80 ◦C in
20 ◦C steps. We measured 125 responses per core by applying a fixed reference challenge (full readout)
to the PUF. Figure 9 shows the bit errors in percent for 10 PUF cores measured in a climatic chamber
(test cases P1 to P6). The plot shows increased bit error values at −20 ◦C and 80 ◦C for certain PUF
cores, which denotes the maximum ratings in terms of operating temperature. Core 9 shows a slightly
increased bit error value at 20 ◦C. This can be explained by the corresponding voltage measurements
at the comparator input terminals. The voltage difference ∆Vcomp for bit position r12 differs only a little
and sometimes turns from positive to negative (flipping between logical 0 and 1).
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Figure 9. Bit errors over ambient temperature.
In a second experiment, we explored the bit errors independent of the evaluation board used.
Therefore, we measured 30 physical PUF core instances at nominal conditions (test case P11) by
utilizing two Evaluation Boards A and B, respectively. Figure 10 shows the corresponding bit error
values. Core 20 shows the greatest bit errors, which we have already explained in our reliability
discussion earlier in this paper. The bit errors remain almost stable if comparing the measurements for
both Evaluation Boards with each other. Moreover, core 16 shows the maximum deviation between
Evaluation Board A and B with ∆BE16 = 0.34%, which is still below 0.5% and hence negligible low.
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Figure 10. Bit errors across different PUF core instances and Evaluation Boards A and B.
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5.5. Discussion on Security Threats
In the past few years, many PUF designs have been successfully attacked using machine learning
(ML) techniques. Thereby, attackers focus on strong PUFs offering a large CRP space [34–36]. The goal
of the attackers is to construct a mathematical clone which behaves like the original PUF. CRPs are
eavesdropped during normal operation of the PUF to gather a data basis for model training. However,
a full readout of a strong PUF is often not possible due to the huge CRP space. Therefore, the goal is
that only a subset of the CRP space must be eavesdropped and is sufficient to gain a trained model
that is highly predictive in terms of estimating other not yet occurred CRPs.
From an attacker’s point of view, the herein presented analog PUF is comparable to the ring
oscillator architecture, due to their similarities of the internal pairwise selection circuitry and bit
generation. In the presented configuration, our design forms a weak PUF with just a single CRP.
In general, applying modeling attacks is not applicable in the context of weak PUFs, since the data
basis for model training is small. For that reason, a full readout of the PUF is more appropriate.
With regard to cryptographic key derivation, the uniformity of the PUF response bits is connected
with the unpredictability of the responses. If the PUF response bits are biased towards 0 or 1, it is
easier for an attacker to guess the response. In general, the assumed distributions of noise and PUF
responses is often normal rather than uniform [37]. This connotes a potential security threat for the
herein proposed analog PUF. To counter this issue, fuzzy extractors can be used to generate unique
keys suitable for cryptographic applications [38,39]. To protect the challenge and response interfaces
from the outside world, weak PUFs are often surrounded by additional obfuscation logics such as
hash functions. This configuration is often referred to as controlled PUF [40]. Figure 11 shows how to
turn the proposed weak PUF into a controlled PUF environment, also including a fuzzy extractor to
generate stable and uniform keys, e.g., for cryptography.
Fuzzy extractor
Hash Hash
Pre-challenge
Challenge
Response
Error
correctionNoisy &
non-uniform
Stable &
non-uniform
Response
Stable & 
uniform
Key
PUF
Figure 11. Exemplary controlled PUF environment to obfuscate the PUF interfaces. An integrated
fuzzy extractor ensures stable and uniform PUF keys.
However, when scaling up the herein presented analog PUF circuit, the CRP space can also
be increased and the PUF becomes a candidate for a strong PUF design. As a consequence,
the investigation of modeling attacks becomes more attractive to spot vulnerabilities towards the PUF’s
unpredictability and physical unclonability. In this context, commonly used attack scenarios come
into account, such as side-channel attacks to eavesdrop CRPs [41]. In the next step, these CRPs can be
used to train a mathematical model of the PUF’s internal behavior using machine learning techniques.
Another option is to create a sorted list of PUF core inverter output voltages, similar to the approach
proposed for RO-PUFs by Ruehrmair et al. in [42].
In this paper, the focus lies on the design, fabrication, and evaluation of an analog PUF platform.
Therefore, performing and discussing modeling attacks on the presented analog PUF design in more
detail will be part of our future work.
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6. Comparison to Other Designs
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, analog-based PUF designs benefit from relatively
simple circuit designs, which make them suitable for the integration into IoT devices that are mostly
bound to hard requirements such as being small-sized, low-cost and having limited resources. Various
analog-based PUF designs have been reported earlier by other working groups [22–26]. In the
following, we provide a closer look at other analog-based PUFs, similar to our system.
The TV-PUF [23] uses two parallel blocks with cascaded pass-transistors. Cascading helps to
accumulate the impact of Vth variation per pass-transistor, which is subtracted from VDD over the
amount of pass-transistor stages. A static voltage sense comparator is used to compare the voltage
levels between the two activated blocks’ output voltages and to generate a bit. The design is simulated
and verified using 45 nm, 65 nm, and 90 nm technology processes.
The TG-PUF [24] utilizes a stimulus/measurement circuit (STM) which consists of 20 ’pseudo’ pass
gates, referred to as transmission gate (TG) [24]. An output voltage is generated, caused by a voltage
drop over a TG, due to the devices’ on resistance (Ron), which is addressed by a selection circuitry.
Furthermore, a voltage-to-digital converter (VDC) is used to sense the generated output voltages.
The design generates voltage differences which are utilized to generate bit-strings. Thresholding
techniques are proposed and applied to generate stable bit responses. The design is fabricated and
verified using a 90 nm technology process.
The VTC-PUF [25] exploits staging of circuit blocks over 64 switches. The VTC circuit block
consists of an inverter and a feedback transistor, which prevents the inverter output to swing either to
the circuits VDD or ground. The design uses two blocks as a pair. The switches act as a challenge and
route the output of the blocks to the according next stage inputs. A voltage sense amplifier, attached to
the last block, is used to compare the staged output voltage differences and generates a bit. This design
is more robust against several ML algorithms in comparison to delay-based PUF architectures such as
Arbiter PUFs, due to the cascading of nonlinear inverter characteristics. The design is simulated and
verified using a 45 nm technology process.
Table 2 shows the reliability, uniqueness, and uniformity metrics for related PUFs and the
proposed PUF platform (bold).
Table 2. Security metrics comparison with related PUFs.
PUF Type Reliability Uniqueness Uniformity Description
Mean Temp. VDD Mean Mean Data Basis Ref.
TV-PUF 96% −25 ◦C...125 ◦C ±20% 50.02% 49.70% Simulation only [23]
TG-PUF ≈100% −40 ◦C...85 ◦C ±10% ≈50% - Prototype IC [24]
VTC-PUF 97.9% 0 ◦C...85 ◦C ±10% 49.8% 50.1% Simulation only [25]
This work 99.20% −20 ◦C...80 ◦C ±10% 48.84% 45.60% Prototype PCB
One should note that the reliability metric evaluations for the different PUF shown in Table 2
have been carried out under various temperature ranges. The smallest temperature range was used
for VTC-PUF, reaching from 0 ◦C to 85 ◦C. All other works, also including the herein proposed
evaluations, additionally applied negative temperatures to their PUF circuits. The direct comparison
of the reliability metrics shows that our fabricated PUFs produce highly reproducible responses,
even under extreme environmental conditions.
In terms of the uniqueness metric, our evaluation results indicate that the PUF responses are
unique, which in connection with the superior reliability value qualifies the proposed design for
identification purposes. However, the uniformity analysis shows that additional effort has to be
spent for pre- and post-processing techniques—as, for instance, additional hash functions and a fuzzy
extractor, to make the PUF responses ready for cryptographic applications.
Altogether, our proposed design shows statistics in the performance metrics close to the ideal
values. Therewith, the PUF platform accomplishes the security-related requirements for PUF designs
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in addition to its unique benefits of accessibility and bitwise understanding on analog and digital
signal levels. Because of the low design complexity of the herein proposed analog-based PUF platform,
the PUF design is a strong candidate as a lightweight security primitive.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a holistic evaluation platform for an analog-based Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF), covering the full software and hardware implementations. We fabricated
30 PUF cores and evaluated their PUF responses under different operating conditions, such as changing
ambient temperatures and varying supply voltages. Due to the additional measurement capabilities of
our evaluation platform, we could trace PUF response bit flips that occurred on the digital level back
to the analog voltage level. Furthermore, we evaluated the bit errors that appear over time for each
single PUF core. The experimental results of the fabricated PUF core instances show superior security
metrics, such as an average reliability of 99.20%, a uniqueness value of 48.84%, a uniformity of 45.60%,
and low bit error rates. In addition, our PUF platform offers the unique benefits of accessibility and
bitwise understanding on analog and digital signal levels. These features make the proposed design
highly suitable as an analog PUF test platform for hardware-centric security. In general, analog PUF
designs as proposed in this work are promising candidates for the use in application fields where
devices underlie strict design or performance constraints, such as in the IoT.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
ADC Analog-to-digital converter
BA Buffer amplifier
CMOS Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor
CRP Challenge-response pair
DAC Digital-to-analog converter
DC Direct current
DEMUX Demultiplexer
HD Hamming distance
IC Integrated circuit
ID Identifier
IoT Internet of things
MUX Multiplexer
NMOS Negative channel metal-oxide-semiconductor
PCB Printed circuit board
PUF Physical unclonable function
RO Ring oscillator
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SCPI Standard Commands for Programmable Instruments
TG Transmission gate
TV Threshold voltage
VDC Voltage-to-digital converter
VTC Voltage transmission characteristics
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